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INTRODUCTION
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STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT
The fact that the trooper did not recognize the out-of-state registration does not amount
to reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is stolen

\ ssi u iiing ai gue ndo. th<: ;1: the ti • : \ Dpe i ha :l i

reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle was stolen, he exceeded the scope of the

of the corncob pipe was not inadvertent nor did it constitute probable cause t o seize the pipe.
ARGUMENT

POINT I.

TROOPER RANDALL UNREASONABLE EXTENDED
THE SCOPE OF THE STOP.
(Reply t o Point I of Appellee's Brief)

The State relies heavily
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registration as reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was stolen (Appellee's Brief at 12). Without

addressing the trooper's decision to enter through the passenger's door to get the VIN number,
the State simply contends that that was irrelevant because after all, the trooper observed a
corncob pipe and that gave him probable cause to search for controlled substances (Appellee's
Brief at 11-12) The States reasoning is flawed for many reasons
First, Trooper Randall's suspicion that the vehicle was stolen was unreasonable

Simply

because he did not recognize the registration did not mean that he had reasonable suspicion that
the vehicle was stolen Likewise, that the registration had some of the information written in
longhand adds nothing to the analysis A check on the VIN number on the dash or a call to West
Virginia authorities regarding the "unusualness" of the registration would have any resolved any
"suspicion" or speculation that the vehicle was stolen
In State v. Robinson, 797 P 2d 431 (Utah App 1990), disagreed with on other grounds,
State v. Lopez, 873 P 2d 1127, 1134 n 3 (Utah 1994), the vehicle was stopped for a traffic
violation (abrupt lane change) Id. at 435

After approaching the vehicle, the officer observed

that one of the occupants, Towers, appeared to be nervous and avoided eye contact whereas as
the other, Robinson, was talkative and evasive about questions concerning the vehicle Id.
Although both occupants claimed to be on a two-week trip to Wyoming, no cold weather gear
was observed The occupants were unable to produce written permission or any other means of
contacting the owner to verify that they had permission to use the vehicle Id In rejecting these
factors as reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, this Court noted.
Even considering all the circumstances facing the troopers, the fact
that defendants could not - during the brief time span of the valid
traffic stop - produce either written authorization from the owner
2

or a successful telephone contact with the owner is insufficient to
provide the officers with reasonable suspicion of car theft or other
serious crime sufficient to justify the roadside detention and
questioning that followed
Id at 436

The instant case has even less merit than Robinson. Here, both Ms Shepard and her
brother indicated that the car was owned by their father, who had recently purchased the vehicle
(R 65) The trooper was given a temporary registration that was consistent with their claim of
the recent purchase l Neither occupant was evasive, nervous and most important, their
explanations were consistent
This case stands in sharp contrast to cases where reasonable suspicion was found to exist
Take, for example, United States v. Soto, 988 F 2d 1548, 1556 (10th Cir 1993) Soto was
stopped for speeding When the officer questioned him about the fact that the registration was in
an entirely different name, Soto claimed that he had borrowed the vehicle from his uncle

The

Court held that the officer's actions to seek corroboration by asking Defendant to provide an
address for uncle was reasonable The defendant's complete failure to respond and his nervous
appearance supported a finding of reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot
Likewise, in United States v. Botero-0spina, 73 F 3d 374 (10th Cir 1995), the officer's
suspicion of criminal activity was ultimately held reasonable There, the officer received the

!

The registration indicated that was a temporary registration valid for 60 days from the
date of issue (which was the date of purchase), pending the receipt of the permanent registration
from the West Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles (R 89-90)
3

defendant's New York driver's license and New Jersey registration under the name, Jaime
Higuero When asked about the discrepancy, the defendant claimed to have bought the car from a
woman in Los Angeles He was unable to give her name or identify the connection between the
woman and the registered owner In addition, the price he claimed to have paid for the vehicle
was suspect and he claimed to have spent the previous night in a town that did not exist
In the instant case, Trooper Randall lacked the specific information needed to make his
suspicions reasonable that Ms Shepard or her brother were involved in criminal activity
POINT II.

TROOPER RANDALL'S DECISION TO HAVE
DEFENDANT EXIT THE CAR WAS NOT LAWFUL
(Reply to Point I C of Appellee's Brief)

Assuming arguendo that the trooper had reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was stolen,
he violated Ms Shepard's Fourth Amendment rights by failing to diligently pursue the
investigation and exceeding the scope of the detention
In State v. Larocco, 19A P 2d 460, 463 (Utah 1990), one issue that the Court focused on
was whether the officers could open a car door to look at the VIN for the purpose of verifying
that it was the same as the VIN number on the dashboard The Court relied heavily on the
reasoning as set forth in New York v. Class, 475 U S , 114-115, 119, 106 S Ct 960, 966, 89
L Ed 2d 81(1986) and followed in State v. Schlosser, 774 P 2d 1132 (Utah 1989)
If the VIN is in the plain view of someone outside the vehicle, there
is no justification for governmental intrusion into the passenger
compartment to see it

Here, it is clear that the reason that Trooper Randall went to the passenger side, was for
4

the sole purpose of getting the VIN number and he wanted to do this from the passenger side for
his own safety (R. 60, 65-66, 72).

Yet, it is well established that there is no justification for the

trooper to enter through the passenger side of the vehicle to look at the VIN which was visible
from the dash.
More important, it is a matter of common sense that the trooper could not have read the
VIN number from inside the vehicle. Not only does he have to climb across to the driver's side of
the car, but the VIN numbers would be upside down. In addition, there is not enough space for
the trooper to have put his head in the windshield to read the upside down numbers. And, if the
trooper really had any safety concerns, contorting his body after entering the car would have
resulted in an extremely vulnerable position.
The State's emphasis on the propriety of ordering the occupants out of the vehicle is
misplaced (Appellee's Brief at 12-13). The issue is whether the trooper had the right to go into
the passenger compartment to look for the VIN number. It is clear, under the cases cited, that he
had no authority to do this. The State is attempting to justify the trooper's decision on an entirely
different basis, which should be rejected as hindsight reconstruction. See United States v.
Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1516 (10th Cir. 1988)("Determining the constitutionality of intrusions
by the prosecution's ability to justify them under some set of objective circumstance would
undermine the Court's concern with limiting unreviewable discretion in the name of the objective
test designed to safeguard that concern").
In addition, the State fails to address the fact that the trooper wholly abandoned his
investigation. Instead, the State summarily dismisses the justification set forth by the trooper:
5

"Of course, Randall never in fact took those actions (comparing VIN number on the form and the
vehicle and/or run a NCIC check on the VIN number) because . . . probable case to believe
defendant was in possession of drug paraphernalia arose before Randall has an opportunity to
check the VIN number on the car" (Appellee's Brief at 12). That is disingenuous. The trooper
started the investigation because of his hunch that the vehicle was stolen. His entering the vehicle
was only to look at the VIN number. To abandon the investigation simply because he had another
reason to search the vehicle underscores the concern that the hunch about the vehicle was merely
a pretext to search for other violations.
When the trooper approached the passenger side of the vehicle, he had unreasonably
extended the scope of the stop. Accordingly, his view of the pipe was unreasonable. It fails the
first and third prongs of the plain view test as set forth in State v. Romero, 660 P. 2d 715 (Utah
1983): (1) the officer must be lawfully present; (2) the item must be in plain view and (3) the
evidence must be clearly incriminating.
POINT III.

THE OBSERVATION OF THE CORNCOB PIPE
DID NOT RISE TO THE LEVEL OF PROBABLE
CAUSE TO SEIZE THE CORNCOB PIPE
(Reply to Point II of Appellee's Brief)

There is nothing inherently unique about a corncob pipe to associate it with marijuana.
Moreover, the items used to ingest marijuana are limited only by ones imagination. Common
sense dictates that any pipe can be used for illicit purposes. But having possession of a corncob
pipe does not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion, let alone probable cause, to believe that it
is used for only illicit purposes.
6

The State stresses the trooper's question of whether the occupants had tobacco
(Appellee's Brief at 15). The lack of tobacco does not automatically mean that it was used for
marijuana, because there are numerous innocent explanations: they could have run out of tobacco,
it could have been their father's pipe, or it could have been a souvenir.
The State cites only three cases, from other jurisdictions, to support the trooper's hunch
that the corncob pipe was a marijuana pipe. Perhaps the most important distinction is found in the
case, State v. Gannaway, 291 Minn. 391, 191 N.W. 2d 255 (1971). During a protective frisk, the
officer found a corncob pipe which was equipped with a metal screen in the bowl. Id. at 392 The
pipe in the instant case was not altered in any manner.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse her
conviction and remand the case for a new trial with an order that the illegally seized evidence be
suppressed.
DATED this

_ day of &M^-a--fy~M-S

•; 1997.

>ALffiREn/LY
'Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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